

**R4**

# USAID/Somalia

## Results Review And Resource Request (R4)

March 31, 2000

***Please Note:***

The attached FY 2002 Results Review and Resource Request ("R4") was assembled and analyzed by the country or USAID operating unit identified on this cover page.

The R4 is a "pre-decisional" USAID document and does not reflect results stemming from formal USAID review(s) of this document.

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## **SOMALIA**

### **R4 Part I: Overview and Factors Affecting Program Performance**

Somalia has been without a central government since dictator Mohamed Siad Barre fled Mogadishu in 1991. Subsequent fighting among rival faction leaders resulted in the killing, dislocation and starvation of thousands of Somalis.

Nine years later, the Somali people continue to struggle against adverse weather and insecurity conditions without the support of a government. UNDP's Human Development Index in 1998 ranked Somalia at the absolute bottom worldwide: the average life expectancy was between 41 and 43 years of age; barely 15%; and 25% of children ever reach five years of age. While no hard data yet exists for 1999, one can safely assume that the situation has not improved significantly. Drought in particular continues to cause untold hardship on the agro-pastoral populations in the south, with as many as 1.2 million at risk from rainfall predicted to be insufficient in the year 2000.

Security and access continue to be the most challenging obstacles in the implementation of humanitarian and development programs in southern Somalia. While road access is open in most areas, security on the road continues to be a major constraint, both for Somalis trying to conduct normal business transactions and for the relief community in its efforts to deliver supplies.

Glimmers of hope have emerged in 1999: the political maturation of Somaliland and, to a lesser extent, Puntland in the north was notable over the past year. In May, the Saudi Arabian government revoked its livestock ban, which had put Somaliland's economy into a steep tailspin since early 1998. In June, the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) liberated Bay and Bakool Regions from Hussein Aideed's forces, and subsequently formed an administration in the regions. In September, Djiboutian President Ismail Omar Guelleh launched a new peace initiative at the U.N. General Assembly. Dubbed the "Djibouti" or "Guelleh" Initiative which seeks both to include civil society and to penalize the warlords if they don't go along. Against this hopeful backdrop, however, the Somalia development assistance budget was slashed from \$4 million in FY1998 TO \$1.5 million in FY1999, which restricted our ability to capitalize on these positive events. Though total USG funding, including disaster and refugee assistance, approached \$25 million, USAID was severely limited its ability to move secure areas of Somalia further along a transition from relief to development.

Even with limited funding, USAID has continued to play a large role in keeping Somalia off the front pages – there is no widespread starvation, no large outflow of refugees as we saw only a few years ago – and U.S. assistance is indeed helping to strengthen certain sectors in targeted areas. In addition to the usual humanitarian response being undertaken in Somalia, such as free food distributions, and emergency health and water interventions, USAID also, through implementing partners, continues to help rehabilitate numerous irrigation canals, river dikes, and farm-to-market roads. As a result, farmers have tended to stay on their land, planting more, and in time we expect, realizing larger and better quality harvests. Refugees are returning from Ethiopia and, to a lesser extent, Kenya, to secure and stable areas in Somaliland, Puntland, and some parts of southern Somalia.

In the absence of central government and in order to help Somalis rebuild the country from the bottom up, USAID has helped build the capacity of local authorities and civil society through technical support to regional/district administrations and indigenous NGOs. The formation in 1999

of a “functioning” Bay and Bakool administrative structure, taken with the other administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, augurs well for the future of those regions and the potential for development programs there. It is also hoped that these steadily progressing local administrative “building blocks” may, in time, cover the country and then be able to negotiate a future national government among themselves.

USAID has also helped establish and lead a unique effective donor coordination group known as the Somalia Aid coordination Body (SACB). The (SACB) is comprised of over 150 organizations, including multilateral and bilateral donors, UN Agencies, and international NGOs. The SACB has established sector committees to address specific problems, such as health and food security, in order to ensure coordinated, cost-efficient, and effective programs to meet the basic human needs of Somalis in the absence of a central authority.

USG assistance to Somalia seeks to ensure that continuing instability in parts of Somalia does not spread to other countries in the Horn. The paramount goal of US policy in Somalia is to encourage the return of Somalia to the international community as a legitimate and reliable member. Supporting successful models of local administration and governance – in Somaliland, Puntland, and possibly Bay and Bakool, for example – is one obvious way to accomplish this goal.

The U.S. assistance strategy for Somalia expired September 30, 1999 and was subsequently extended for two years. However, positive change and an evolving political landscape have led Washington decision-makers to ask REDSO to revise the Somalia strategy. As a result, and with a commitment to participate from several Washington-based officers in AID and State, REDSO plans to begin the process in revision in August 2000 with the objective of submitting an updated Integrated Strategic Plan at the end of FY 2000 and the hope of having an approved new strategy early in FY 2001.

The Djibouti Initiative to promote reconciliation of the various political factions and clans, a reunified Somalia, and a central government got underway in January, 2000. A major conference of Somalis is scheduled for April, 2000. Djibouti authorities are being aided by several elements of Somali civil society, the U.N. Political Office for Somalia, IGAD, and pledges of support from various donors. Plans that have evolved thus far are not without their many critics but, despite apparent flaws, continue to enjoy the support of the donor community and some, but not all, elements of Somali society. Mid-year will be a critical period that may determine the success or failure of the initiative.

REDSO can increase its efforts to foster a peaceful transition in Somalia and an accelerated evolution toward democracy and reconciliation with additional resources, should Washington policymakers determine that increased USG support is warranted by recent accomplishments.

## PART II: Results Review

Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia

Objective ID: 649-001-01

Objective Name: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas

Self Assessment: Exceeding Expectations

Self Assessment Narrative: SO 1 achievements have surpassed performance expectations. All SO and IR indicators were met or exceeded, despite the poor weather conditions over 1999 impacting harvests in southern Somalia. USAID's interventions helped mitigate the effects of drought in rainfed areas, and contributed to substantially increased production in irrigated areas.

Primary Link to Strategic Agency Framework: 1.2 Ag Development/Food Security  
(please select only one)

Secondary Link to Strategic Agency Framework:  
(select as many as you require)

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.1 Private Markets                                   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1.2 Ag Development/Food Security         |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1.3 Economic Opportunity for Poor          | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.1 Rule of Law/Human Rights                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2.2 Credible Political Processes                      | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.3 Politically Active Civil Society                |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2.4 Accountable Gov't Institutions                    | <input type="checkbox"/> 3.1 Access to Ed/Girl's Education                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3.2 Higher Ed/Sustainable Development                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.1 Unintended Pregnancies Reduced                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.2 Infant/Child Health/Nutrition                     | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.3 Child Birth Mortality Reduced                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.4 HIV/AIDS  | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.5 Infectious Diseases Reduced                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.1 Global Climate Change                             | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.2 Biological Diversity                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.3 Sustainable Urbanization/Pollution                | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.4 Environmentally Sound Energy                    |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 5.5 Natural Resource Management            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6.1 Impact of Crises Reduced             |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 6.2 Urgent Needs in Time of Crisis Met     | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.3 Security/Basic Institutions Reestablished       |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.1 Responsive Assist Mechanisms Developed | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.2 Program Effectiveness Improved       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.3 Commit Sustainable Development Assured            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.4 Technical/Managerial Capacity Expand |

Link to U.S. National Interests: Humanitarian Response

Primary Link to MPP Goals: Humanitarian Assistance

Secondary Link to MPP Goals (optional): Regional Stability

Summary of the SO:

The purpose of this SO is to improve the foundation for agricultural production in southern and central Somalia to a point where farmers remain on their land, those previously displaced return, and

planting is substantially increased. This objective contributes directly to, and is necessary to achieve, a subgoal of “Increased Food Crop Production in Target Areas”.

REDSO's Somalia Country Program Team and its partners believe that an actual increase in production is too ambitious to be achieved given the current timeframe, limited donor resources, and the continually changing weather and security conditions in Somalia. Thus, the main assumption underlying SO1 is that an improved foundation for agricultural production will in time contribute to increased food crop production and ultimately to improved household food security.

Principal beneficiaries and ultimate customers are the farmers of southern and central Somalia who are some of the most vulnerable and least food-secure populations in the country. They are at the mercy of unpredictable weather patterns and civil insecurity. Their clans generally offer them little or no protection. A large proportion of those displaced within the country, as well as refugees in Kenya, are farmers from southern Somalia.

Principal results necessary to achieve this SO are: increased availability of agricultural inputs and services for farmers in target areas; improved agricultural infrastructure in target areas; and increased investment by farmers in agriculture in target areas.

#### Key Results:

USAID interventions over the past year improved the foundation for food crop production in target areas. This was accomplished through the provision of agricultural inputs and services such as seeds, tools and extension training; by improving agricultural infrastructure such as irrigation canals and river embankments; and promoting increased investment by farmers through micro-credit and encouragement of community contributions. CARE's Rural Food Security Project (RFSP) in particular, due to impressive community interest and participation, helped to substantially improve food security in the target areas.

#### Performance and Prospects:

In spite of the drought conditions in 1999, improved agricultural infrastructure, farmer training, and availability of seeds has helped farmers expand their irrigated area to 84,687 hectares, compared to the 18,891 hectares originally planned (Table 1). This resulted from the work of CARE through its Rural Food Security Project (RFSP). The achievement in improved infrastructure as detailed in IR 1.2 and the synergies between CARE's two USAID programs in southern Somalia have dramatically increased the capacity of the NGOs and their ability to implement activities.

#### Intermediate Result 1.1: Increased Availability of Agricultural Inputs and Services for Farmers in Target Areas.

The objective of IR 1.1 is to increase farmers' utilization of improved agricultural techniques, such as more environmentally sound pest management and better cropping practices. Over 3,700 selected farmers were trained as agricultural extension workers, and they, in turn, trained numerous others in their communities. The SO level success is well demonstrated by the fact that many more farm families are now actually practicing new techniques. In addition, 46,000 vulnerable farm families (Table 2) received seeds through the CARE activity, which helped compensate for seed shortages due to six consecutive poor harvests in certain agricultural areas of southern Somalia.

#### Intermediate Result 1.2: Improved Agricultural Infrastructure in Target Areas.

This IR captures the Food for Work (FFW) activities which rehabilitate canals, river embankments, farm-to-market feeder roads and other infrastructure needed by farmers for increased production and marketing. These results are achieved mainly using P.L.480 Title II food commodities.

USAID more than quadrupled the kilometers of canal rehabilitation over the originally-set target (Table 3). The 2,013 km of canals accomplished resulted in a dramatic increase in the hectares under irrigation (from 3,919 hectares in 1997 to 53,516 hectares in 1998 to 84,687 hectares in 1999). This increase will bring about positive changes in food security for thousands of households in the target areas and will help keep farmers on their land, thereby reducing the number of displaced people in Somalia.

Intermediate Result 1.3: Increased Investment by Farmers in Agriculture in Target Areas. The indicator for this IR is “number of agricultural loans taken by farm families in target areas”. Through 1999, there were 9,356 cumulative agricultural loans disbursed against 3,920 planned (Table 4). Even more important, the repayment rate has been 94%. The agricultural loans can be repaid either with cash or crops, and the high repayment rate is a testament to farmers’ surpluses due to the loans. Community contributions to projects are also worth noting: an estimated 5% of each project’s total value is donated by the community in the form of cash, labor, warehouse space, etc.

#### Possible Adjustments to Plans:

BHR/FFP continues to support CARE’s Rural Food Security Project, and the project will continue in 2000. CARE will continue to work with international NGOs such as World Vision (the largest food for work implementer in Somalia) and ADRA; and expand geographic coverage in southern and central Somalia. However, the CARE Umbrella Grant will end in June 2000, which may affect future results under IRs 1.1 and 1.3.

#### Other Donor Programs:

While USAID is the major donor in this sector, WFP continues to be active in southern Somalia with a number of FFW projects to rehabilitate infrastructure. The EU has funded some international NGOs as well. In the absence of a central government in Somalia, all activities are coordinated under the umbrella of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB) and, in particular, its Food Security Sectoral Committee.

#### Major Contractors and Grantees:

The SO’s primary partner is CARE, through both its Rural Food Security Project and Umbrella Grant. CARE’s subgrantees include World Vision, ADRA and other international and local NGOs.

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas			
Objective ID: 649-001-01			
Approved: 10/15/96		Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia	
Result Name: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas			
Indicator: 3: Hectares directly irrigated through new or rehabilitated canals in target areas			
Unit of Measure: Number	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: CARE will collect, analyze, and aggregate data from its implementing partner organizations.	1996 (B)		3,730
	1997	8,591	3,919
Indicator/Description: Canals include main and secondary canals. Target areas are defined as the project sites where USAID funded activities are taking place. These sites are located mainly within the main 9 agricultural regions of Somalia.	1998	13,691	53,516
	1999	18,891	84,687
This is a cumulative figure.			
Comments: USAID began a partnership with CARE in 1998 to implement FFW activities – a large proportion of which have helped rehabilitate irrigation canals. Due to surprisingly high community interest and participation, the results have been nothing short of impressive.			



### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas			
Objective ID: 649-001-01			
Approved: 10/15/96		Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia	
Result Name: 1.1 : Increased availability of agricultural inputs and services for farmers in target areas			
Indicator: 1: Number of vulnerable farm families in target areas that were affected by crisis that received seeds			
Unit of Measure: Number	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: CARE	1996 (B)		11,910
Indicator/Description: The number of farm families in target areas that received seeds in the past year due to a crisis. Vulnerable farmers targeted for distribution of seeds include families that have no seeds reserved for planting due to recent drought or other severe hardship, as well as returning IDPs or refugees. The assistance is provided to help the farmers' plant in the next season. Note that this assistance is expected to be provided only in response to specific circumstances and special needs, and not on an ongoing basis. Therefore, it is not possible to set precise longer range target levels for the second and third years of the ISP period, although general estimated targets can be set. It should be possible to set more precise targets for shorter time horizons into the future.  A farm family is defined as a family unit that farms the same piece(s) of land. Target areas are defined as the project sites where USAID and its partners are funding activities. These sites are located mainly within the main 9 agricultural regions of Somalia.  This is an annual figure.	1997	15,460	66,264
	1998	13,500	15,686
	1999	13,500	46,013
Comments: While we had expected a lower number of families to need seeds in 1999, due to recurring drought CARE, through OFDA funding, provided nearly 800 MT of seeds to vulnerable families in Bay, Bakool, Middle and Lower Shabelle regions.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas			
Objective ID: 649-001-01			
Approved: 10/15/96		Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia	
Result Name: 1.2: Improved agricultural infrastructure in target areas			
Indicator: 2: Length of irrigation canals constructed or rehabilitated in target areas			
Unit of Measure: Number of kilometers	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Implementing partners of USAID	1996 (B)		132
Indicator/Description: Both primary and secondary canals are included. Target areas are defined as the project sites where USAID-funded activities are taking place. These sites are located mainly within the main 9 agricultural regions of Somalia.	1997	257	200
	1998	377	780
	1999	497	2,013
This is a cumulative number.			
Comments: The target was far surpassed, as demand for the rehabilitation of canals continued to grow, attracting more indigenous NGOs to CARE's Rural Food Security Project (RFSP).			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Improved Foundation for Food Crop Production in Target Areas			
Objective ID: 649-001-01			
Approved: 10/15/96		Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia	
Result Name: 1.3: Increased investments by farmers in agriculture in target areas			
Indicator: 2: Number of agricultural loans taken by farm families in target areas			
Unit of Measure: Number	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Implementing partners of USAID	1996 (B)		420
Indicator/Description: This indicator tracks the number of agricultural loans disbursed in USAID-funded project sites. Loans included are those specifically taken for agricultural activities. These sites are located mainly within the main 9 agricultural regions of Somalia.	1997	1,920	2,740
	1998	2,920	6,358
	1999	3,920	9,356
This is a cumulative number.			
Comments: Note that this indicator is a proxy measure of actual investment by farm families in agriculture. However, since the loans are specifically taken for agricultural activities, it is a very close proxy.			
The target was exceeded in 1999 in recognition that, due to prolonged poor harvests, significantly more customers would be in need of such credit. It should be noted that, despite the dire circumstances, the average repayment rate for these loans was an impressive 94%.			

Country/Organization: Somalia/REDSO

Objective ID: 649-002-01

Objective Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups

Self Assessment: On Track

Self Assessment Narrative: Overall performance in achieving SO 2 was very good this year, considering serious security constraints that affected most international agencies operating in Southern and Central Somalia. Most SO and IR indicators met or exceeded performance expectations. The few indicators that achieved lower than expected results are primarily due to continuing crucial insecurity problems in Somalia, which have greatly affected delivery of humanitarian aid to vulnerable groups.

Primary Link to Strategic Agency Framework:  
(please select only one)

6.2 Urgent Needs in Time of Crisis Met

Secondary Link to Strategic Agency Framework:  
(select as many as you require)

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.1 Private Markets                                   | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1.2 Ag Development/Food Security         |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.3 Economic Opportunity for Poor                     | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.1 Rule of Law/Human Rights                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2.2 Credible Political Processes                      | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.3 Politically Active Civil Society                |
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| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.4 HIV/AIDS  | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.5 Infectious Diseases Reduced                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.1 Global Climate Change                             | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.2 Biological Diversity                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.3 Sustainable Urbanization/Pollution                | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.4 Environmentally Sound Energy                    |
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| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.1 Responsive Assist Mechanisms Developed | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.2 Program Effectiveness Improved       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.3 Commit Sustainable Development Assured            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.4 Technical/Managerial Capacity Expand |

Link to U.S. National Interests: Humanitarian Response

Primary Link to MPP Goals: Humanitarian Assistance

Secondary Link to MPP Goals (optional): Regional Stability

Summary of the SO:

Principal results necessary to achieve this SO are: critical needs met for vulnerable groups; improved delivery systems for emergency food commodities; improved identification of vulnerable groups; and improved capacity to meet social services to targeted vulnerable groups.

#### Key Results:

The REDSO Somalia team's assessment is that Somali livelihoods were improved and emergency needs have been met in targeted areas as a direct result of USAID funding. During the past year, critical needs have been met for targeted vulnerable groups by improved delivery systems for emergency food commodities; improved identification of vulnerable groups; and improved capacity to meet critical social services to targeted vulnerable groups.

Specifically, the achievement of the SO has been demonstrated by an increased percentage of children receiving vitamin A treatment and being fully vaccinated; the number of essential drug kit deliveries; number of health workers certified and local aid agency staff trained in vulnerability assessments; an increased number of people with access to latrines and potable water in targeted areas as a result of USAID funded interventions; the number of vulnerable persons that received food aid within an agreed upon time; and very low food transportation losses.

#### Performance and Prospects:

The general food security situation in Somalia remains precarious. The results of the 1999 main Gu cereal crop, accounting for some 75 to 80 percent of the annual production in normal years, was poor. Overall cereal production is 41 percent below the harvest of 1997, considered to be the last normal Gu, and 29 percent below the post-war average harvest. The reduced 1999 Gu cereal crop represents the sixth consecutive poor harvest in Somalia. Continued weather outcasts predict below average rainfall, and drought conditions may continue to take a toll on the already depleted traditional coping mechanisms.

The food crises, combined with cholera and measles outbreaks, left only part of the year when regular program planning and implementation was possible. During that time, USAID supported Somalia's second National Immunization Days (NIDs) in Central and Southern Somalia. Due to the intensive efforts of the NIDS, some of the SO indicator targets were exceeded. The results continue to be very good: a very impressive 81% of children (compared to the planned 45%) age 5 and under received vitamin A treatment (Table 5); 67% of children (compared to the planned 65%) under 12 months old were fully vaccinated in targeted catchment areas (Table 6); 312,915 people had access to latrines (target of 190,000) as a result of USAID funded interventions; and 397,000 people had access to potable water in target areas (Table 7)

During the emergency, notably among the IDPs and most vulnerable villages, emphasis was put on ensuring that children had access to nutritious food regardless of their current nutritional status. UNICEF's new approach in supplementary feeding aims to prevent children in acute crises from losing weight and becoming more vulnerable to communicable diseases. In addition, CARE's emergency food aid distributions throughout targeted areas of Southern Somalia had a tremendous impact in addressing food insecurity. A total of 1,004,710 vulnerable people received timely delivery of food aid (Table 8).

An inter-agency response was coordinated by the Somalia Aid Coordinating Body (SACB) in an attempt to pre-empt a full-blown famine. USAID's responses were made in consultative cooperation with the SACB and its sectoral coordination groups, including the newly formed Humanitarian Response Group, designed to respond to mobilize response quickly for humanitarian crises in Somalia. The SACB is a unique donor/NGO/IO institution that takes the lead in mobilizing resources and developing strategy across sectors. USAID has played a key role in developing and

strengthening the SACB, and this role has allowed the USG to leverage resources from various sources in a highly effective way.

**Possible Adjustments to Plans:**

Anticipated funding for health development activities will be meager in FY 2000 and beyond.

However, it is expected that OFDA will meet emergency health needs covered under this SO during FY 2000, so projected annual results for SO 2 are likely to be achieved. The Somalia team foresees the most critical activities under SO 2 will be meeting basic humanitarian needs in Somalia.

Moreover, future results under this objective will remain dependent upon sustained or increased funding from BHR/OFDA and BHR/FFP, unless DA funding is increased. For example, note in the tables that projected targets for the humanitarian objective (SO2) for FY 2000 and FY 2001 are lower than previous years due to expected reduction in emergency funding for the Somalia program, not due to performance related reasons.

**Other Donor Programs:**

Although USAID continues to be a major donor in meeting the critical needs of vulnerable people in Somalia, other active donors include ECHO, EU, UNICEF, DFID, Dutch Embassy, Swedish Embassy and the Danish Embassy.

**Major Contractors and Grantees:**

Primary partners implementing SO 2 include UNICEF, CARE, Associates in Rural Development for the Famine Early Warning System (FEWS), IMC, ADRA, ACF France and NPA.

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Objective ID: 649-002-01			
Approved:		Country/Organization: Somalia/REDSO	
Result Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Indicator: 1a: Percent of children 5 and under that have received vitamin A treatment			
Unit of Measure: Percent as measured by: # of children under 5 that received vitamin A treatment [Total targeted catchment area x 17%]  Source: UNICEF, IMC  Indicator/Description: Treatment requires two doses per year	Year	Planned	Actual
	1996 (B)		25
	1997	35	43.8
	1998	40	58
	1999	45	81
	2000	50	
	2001	50	
Comments: Achievements for this result indicator had phenomenal results in 1999. During the reporting period, a major push was made in the provision of Vitamin A supplementation for children six months to five years of age through the NIDS (National Immunization Day) campaigns. Supplementation was also carried out through Koranic and primary schools, EPI teams, and TBAs, CHWs and MCH centers.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Objective ID: 649-002-01			
Approved: 1997		Country/Organization: Somalia/REDSO	
Result Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Indicator: 1b: Percent of children under 12 months old that have been fully vaccinated			
Unit of Measure: # of children under 12 months [Total targeted catchment area x 4%]	Year	Planned	Actual
	1996 (B)		30
Source: UNICEF, IMC	1997	45	41.5
Indicator/Description: Fully vaccinated means that a child has been vaccinated for all of the following: a. Tuberculosis (BCG) b. Measles c. Polio (O) d. Diphtheria Pertussis tetanus (DPT)	1998	55	58
	1999	65	67
	2000	65	
	2001	65	
Comments: A higher level of immunizations was achieved this year due to the national immunization days (NIDs) that UNICEF coordinated throughout Somalia in 1999.			



### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Objective ID: 649-002-01			
Approved: 1997		Country/Organization: Somalia/REDSO	
Result Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Indicator: 4: Number of people with access to potable water in target areas as a result of USAID interventions			
Unit of Measure: Number	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: CARE, ADRA, ACF, UNICEF	1996 (B)		293,155
Indicator/Description: There was no single, standardized method for determining access. However, the method used for calculating the # who have access is based on the following information: a. Estimate of catchment area population; b. Estimate # in need within the catchment population; c. Information on # that could be served by the particular type of water source being developed. All of this information is analyzed with reference to the specific locality to determine an estimate of additional people gaining access. This is an annual figure.	1997	347,045	431,417
	1998	370,000	106,700
	1999	335,000	497,000
	2000	350,000	
	2001	250,000	
Comments: This target was exceeded in 1999 in recognition of underlying drought in Somalia – which caused AID and partner agencies to focus and divert resources to water rehabilitation activities.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Objective ID: 649-002-01			
Approved: 1997		Country/Organization: Somalia/REDSO	
Result Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Indicator: Number of vulnerable persons that received food aid with an agreed upon time			
Unit of Measure: Number	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: Distribution Plan and CARE & UNICEF distribution records and monitoring report; IMC	1996 (B)		328,513
	1997	300,000	802,759
Indicator/Description: Food aid includes food for work, supplemental feedings and free food distributions	1998	300,000	312,990
	1999	300,000	1,004,710
	2000	500,000	
	2001	400,000	
Comments: The target was far surpassed – more than triple the anticipated achievement – primarily due to CARE and UNICEF’s activities in emergency food distribution and supplementary feeding in 1999. This intervention has alleviated food insecurity in Southern/Central Somalia.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Critical Needs Met for Targeted Vulnerable Groups			
Objective ID: 649-002-01			
Approved: 1997		Country/Organization: Somalia/REDSO	
Result Name: Improved capacity to meet critical social services to targeted vulnerable groups			
Indicator: 1: Percent of target health centers that received at least 90% of the requested essential drug kits on time			
Unit of Measure: Percent as measured by:	Year	Planned	Actual
Number of essential kits delivered to the health centers	1996 (B)		86.5
[Number of kits actually requested by the health centers]	1997	92.5	71
Source: UNICEF, IMC	1998	96	93
Indicator/Description: Health centers include MCH centers, OPDs, HPs and TBAs.	1999	97	78
Requested is the amount actually requested from the partner NGOs, not the amount originally estimated during the planning period.	2000	82	
On time means the kits were delivered within X days of the agreed upon delivery date.	2001	82	
This is an annual figure.			
Comments: Results under this indicator were 19% below anticipated targets. It should be noted that full achievement of this indicator is contingent upon timely delivery of drugs – not if drugs were actually delivered. Major constraints to achievement this year included: serious security obstacles (i.e., road closure, clan fighting, etc.) resulting in limited timely delivery of UNICEF medical supplies to remote areas of Southern Somalia; lack of international partner agencies to receive/distribute drugs, primarily due to more international agencies pulling out of Southern Somalia; and problems with the procurement and logistics pipeline for the procurement of drugs.  Projected indicator targets for the humanitarian objective (SO2) have been made for FY 2000 and FY 2001. Note that the targets are lower than previous years due to expected reduction in emergency funding and overall funding for the Somalia program, not due to performance related reasons.			

Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia

Objective ID: 649-003-01

Objective Name: Increased Community Capacity to Meet Its Own Needs

Self Assessment: On Track

Self Assessment Narrative: The SPO results are generally on track. Due to the serious cut in DA funding in FY99 (from \$4.0 million in 1998 to \$1.5 million), results slipped a bit compared to 1998. However, achievements were still impressive and surpassed the targets set with the expectation of \$4 million for FY99.

Primary Link to Strategic Agency Framework: 2.3 Politically Active Civil Society  
(please select only one)

Secondary Link to Strategic Agency Framework:  
(select as many as you require)

- |  |  |
|--|--|
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.1 Private Markets                                   | <input type="checkbox"/> 1.2 Ag Development/Food Security                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 1.3 Economic Opportunity for Poor                     | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2.1 Rule of Law/Human Rights             |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 2.2 Credible Political Processes                      | <input type="checkbox"/> 2.3 Politically Active Civil Society                |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 2.4 Accountable Gov't Institutions         | <input type="checkbox"/> 3.1 Access to Ed/Girl's Education                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 3.2 Higher Ed/Sustainable Development                 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.1 Unintended Pregnancies Reduced                  |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.2 Infant/Child Health/Nutrition                     | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.3 Child Birth Mortality Reduced                   |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 4.4 HIV/AIDS  | <input type="checkbox"/> 4.5 Infectious Diseases Reduced                     |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.1 Global Climate Change                             | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.2 Biological Diversity                            |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.3 Sustainable Urbanization/Pollution                | <input type="checkbox"/> 5.4 Environmentally Sound Energy                    |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 5.5 Natural Resource Management                       | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.1 Impact of Crises Reduced                        |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 6.2 Urgent Needs in Time of Crisis Met                | <input type="checkbox"/> 6.3 Security/Basic Institutions Reestablished       |
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.1 Responsive Assist Mechanisms Developed | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.2 Program Effectiveness Improved       |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 7.3 Commit Sustainable Development Assured            | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 7.4 Technical/Managerial Capacity Expand |

Link to U.S. National Interests: Humanitarian Response

Primary Link to MPP Goals: Regional Stability

Secondary Link to MPP Goals (optional): Democracy and Human Rights

Summary of the SO:

The purpose of the Special Objective is to strengthen local Somali capacity to manage donor assistance and establish decentralized planning and program analysis capabilities. Two major channels to achieve these results have been undertaken: 1) Assisting established local administrative structures to acquire essential technical and functional knowledge to better govern their communities. This includes assistance to put accounting systems in place, collect taxes, and distribute revenues

equitably within the communities; and 2) Empowering civil society by increasing the financial, administrative, and programming capacity of indigenous NGOs.

Currently, each area of Somalia is evolving its own rules and regulations, including laws and legal codes. For example, the self-declared “independent” Somaliland maintains a civilian legal system, enforcing the pre-war Somalia Civil Code. Somaliland has pioneered inter-clan reconciliation with relative success.

Puntland Regional State was formed in 1998, and one of the most significant events of 1999 was the liberation of Bay and Bakool Regions by the Rahanweyn Resistance Army (RRA) from Hussein Aided's forces, and the subsequent establishment of an authority over the two regions.

Unlike Somaliland, Puntland and Bay/Bakool consider themselves integral parts within the state of Somalia, but with significant (and presently de facto “total”) autonomy in the political, economic, and social spheres. While the nascent Bay/Bakool administration has not yet established firm control of its territory, both it and the Puntland administration are credible within the local communities, and serve as concrete “building blocks” of a bottom-up approach to reestablishing a central government in the country.

The SPO's ultimate beneficiaries, direct or indirect, are the Somalis in the target regions. Somalia in general will also benefit from technical analysis and studies carried out under this SPO, which are relevant to the formation of a sustainable national development policy and establishment of peace and security in these areas.

Principal results necessary to achieve this SPO are: more operational local administrative structures; increased ability of local NGOs to provide community services; increased availability of decision-making information; and a strengthened private enterprise sector.

#### Key Results:

Over the past year, REDSO's Somalia team has helped build communities' capacities to meet their own needs. This has been accomplished through: operationalizing local administrative structures; increasing the ability of NGOs to provide community services; increasing the availability of information necessary for informed decision making; and strengthening private enterprise and entrepreneurs.

#### Performance and Prospects:

Performance toward achieving the Special Objective over the last year was on track. Through the work of the UNDP/UN Development Office for Somalia (UNDOS), USAID assistance to local administrative structures (LAS) has increased their capacity to improve the services they provide to their respective communities, as demonstrated by data that shows 48% of revenues collected in target LASs expended on basic services, up from 45% in 1998 (Table 1). Though results are admittedly meager to date -- not unusual for a pilot Special Objective -- they nonetheless indicate that this SO activity is on the right path.

Assistance to civil society through the CARE Umbrella Grant, on the other hand, has consistently delivered solid results throughout the country, both in project implementation (provision of credit, agricultural extension, etc.) as well as strengthened capacity of the local NGOs.

In addition, ADRA continues to work intensively with the Northeast Somalia Highway Authority (NESHA) in Puntland, which was formed before the government itself. While receiving government support through a fuel levy, NESHA has achieved a special status with significant autonomy over its affairs, not falling under any one government ministry. In 2000, it is expected that NESHA's Executive Body will produce a solid report to its Board of Directors (in which government ministries as well as levy-payers will be represented), which in turn will be accountable to the Puntland Parliament.

The War-Torn Societies Project is an innovative UNDP-implemented research-cum-action project that has helped create a conducive environment for consolidating peace and promoting sustainable development in Puntland and Somaliland. It is also an important component in building communities' capacities. Details on its achievements are presented in the "success stories" section of REDSO's R4 .

#### Intermediate Result 1.1 Local Administrative Structures Operationalized

Regional and district councils, or any other local administration that is assisted, will be trained and will have acquired the minimum institutional capacity necessary to provide a secure socio-economic environment. With continued work by UNDOS, more Local Administrative Structures are developing annual work plans (5 regional bodies in 1999 compared to 4 in 1998 and 1 in 1997) and putting systems for collecting taxes in place (5 in 1999 compared to 4 in 1998 and 2 in 1997). The embryonic Bay/Bakool administration also offers hope for future stability – and opportunities for strengthening local authorities – in southern Somalia.

#### Intermediate Result 1.2: Increased Ability of NGOs to Provide Community Services

The importance of the NGO sector in rebuilding Somalia from the ground up cannot be overstated. A strong and competent cadre of NGOs in Somalia is absolutely essential to Somalia's future. CARE has worked hard to establish this corps of NGOs which have progressively increased their capacity, both to manage themselves administratively and financially, as well as to implement useful activities in the field. The capacity ratings of over 20 local NGOs have increased dramatically – 83% are certified as competent (Table 2), and CARE will publish a pamphlet in 2000 extolling its 15 best local partners over the years. Following CARE's success with local NGOs, other donors have become interested in working with them, and it is hoped that this document will help advocate for, and facilitate funding for, the best that CARE has worked with since 1993.

Due to the demonstrated competence and ability of these local NGOs, a number of them are also working with CARE's Rural Food Security Project to achieve the impressive results reported for SO 1.

#### Intermediate Result 1.3: Increased Availability of Information Necessary for Informed Decision Making

In the Somalia context, it is abundantly clear that community consensus is essential for local government units to operate successfully. In order for the community to be more supportive, information must be made available to individual citizens, in order to have a greater understanding of the process and underlying rationale for the decisions made. Community involvement becomes increasingly important as LASs begin to collect revenues from their citizens, and provide services to the community at large. Consensus can also be built by sharing information about the success of

other LAS in the country. Given that the adult literacy rate in Somalia is barely 15%, however, we continue to grapple with finding the appropriate medium of information dissemination. The WSP project is working with women in Puntland to translate English documents into Somali. And private local radio stations, now springing up in Somalia, may offer the best means in the future to transmit critical information to local communities.

#### Intermediate Result 1.4: Private enterprise/entrepreneurs strengthened

By providing micro-credit loans to farmers and small businesspeople, USAID expects community investment to increase, and private enterprise will be strengthened. CARE disbursed 3,268 loans in 1999 (Table 3), including maintaining high repayment rates – 94% in the agricultural sector (over 90% of the total loans disbursed), while slipping to 54% in other sectors (Table 4).

##### Possible Adjustments to Plans:

UNDOS has been fully integrated into UNDP, which may affect FY2000 results positively or negatively depending on UNDP's strategy. More importantly, the CARE "Umbrella Grant" Cooperative Agreement, since 1993 one of USAID's most successful projects in Somalia, will end in June, 2000. However, REDSO will initiate a new activity to continue USG support for strengthening the capacity of Somali civil society, perhaps more specifically targeting geographic areas of security and stability to implement the "building blocks" approach.

##### Other Donor Programs:

UNDP and the EU are the main donors in conflict mitigation/capacity building activities, especially in the northern part of the country. All activities are coordinated under the umbrella of the Somalia Aid Coordination Body (SACB), in particular its Local Administrative Structures sectoral committee.

##### Major Contractors and Grantees:

CARE (under the Somalia Partnership Program cooperative agreement, sometimes referred to as the CARE Umbrella Grant) is the lead organization working with local NGOs in Somalia, both to increase their financial and administrative capacity, as well as their ability to implement projects effectively. UNDO and ADRA also work with local administrations and organizations to this end. The UNDP War-Torn Societies project helps communities to consolidate peace and promote sustainable development.

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Increased community capacity to meet its own needs			
Objective ID: 649-003-01			
Approved: 10/15/96		Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia	
Result Name: Increased community capacity to meet its own needs			
Indicator: 3: Percent of revenues collected in target Local Administrative Structures that are expended on basic services			
Unit of Measure: % as measured by:  Sum of the % increase in revenues spent of basic services/ Number of LAS with Bookkeeping systems in place Source: UNDOS, Expert Assessment; LAS records	Year	Planned	Actual
	1996 (B)		N/A
	1997	45%	38%
	1998	50%	45%
	1999	55%	48%
Indicator/Description: Basic services include: security, education, health, sanitation and water.  Target Local Administrative Structures, for this indicator only, include those Regional Administrative Structures with a bookkeeping system in place.  This is an annual figure.			
Comments: For all of the indicators measuring Local Administrative Structures (LAS), USAID is referring to the following five Regional Administrative Structures: Hiran, Middle Shabelle, Somaliland, Puntland, and Galgadud.			



### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Increased community capacity to meet its own needs			
Objective ID: 649-003-01			
Approved: 10/15/96		Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia	
Result Name: 1.2: Increased ability of NGOs to provide community services			
Indicator: 2: Percent of NGOs, completing capacity training, rated as competent			
Unit of Measure: Percent as measured by: # of NGOs with a overall CARE capacity rating greater or equal to 3.5/ # of NGOs completing training	Year	Planned	Actual
	1996 (B)		N/A
	1997	70%	66%
	1998	85%	85.6%
	1999	85%	83%
Source: CARE capacity survey			
Indicator/Description: The Care Index measures NGO capacity in four areas: Government, Finance, Management and Technical.  An NGO would have to receive an overall average rating of 3.5, on a scale of 1 to 5 in order to receive a rating of competent.  This is a cumulative figure over time.			
Comments: CARE expected to attain 100% competency of its local NGOs by the end of 1999, but slipped somewhat due to sudden reduction in development funding in the last year of the Umbrella Grant.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Increased community capacity to meet its own needs			
Objective ID: 649-003-01			
Approved: 10/15/96		Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia	
Result Name: 1.4: Private enterprise/entrepreneurs strengthened			
Indicator: 1: Loans granted under the CARE Umbrella Grant*			
Unit of Measure: Total number	Year	Planned	Actual
Source: CARE	1996 (B)		850
Indicator/Description: The is the number of loans made during USAID's fiscal year. This is an annual figure.	1997	1,500	2,320
	1998	1,100	3,715
	1999	1,100	3,268
Comments: Many more loans were disbursed than planned (especially agricultural loans) due to great demand during drought conditions.			
*To the extent that agriculture loans are included in this indicator they are also reflected in SO1.			

### Performance Data Table

Objective Name: Increased community capacity to meet its own needs			
Objective ID: 649-003-01			
Approved: 10/15/96		Country/Organization: REDSO/Somalia	
Result Name: 1.4 Private enterprise/entrepreneurs strengthened			
Indicator: 2: Loan Repayment Rate*			
Unit of Measure: % as measured by: # of loans classified as being repaid/ Total # of loans  NB: This indicator represents the fiscal year and is not cumulative. In addition to the rate, a narrative will also be provided addressing loans written off during the period.  Source: CARE, Umbrella Grant records  Indicator/Description: Repayment includes loans being repaid that are no more than 6 months in arrears and loans fully repaid during the USAID fiscal year.  For the purpose of clarity (see NB above) this indicator will be desegregated in two categories: Agriculture and Other Loans Repayment Rates  This is an annual figure.  Comments: Despite the disbursement of more loans than planned, the repayment rate continued to be phenomenal in the agricultural sector, but slipped in other sectors due to sudden reduction in DA funding.  *To the extent that agriculture loans are included in this indicator they are also reflected in SO1.	Year	Planned	Actual
	1997	80%	93%
		Agriculture	
	1997	80%	70%
		Other Loans	
	1998	80%	97%
		Agriculture	
	1998	80%	70%
		Other Loans	
	1999	80%	94%
	Agriculture		
	1999	80%	54%
		Other Loans	